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Abstract 
Empirical evidence for the existence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program 
has been inconclusive.  Here, we seek empirical evidence of moral hazard in the U.S. 
crop insurance program, departing from the established empirical literature in two 
significant respects.  First, we attempt to uncover evidence of moral hazard by examining 
the effects of crop insurance on post-planting crop abandonment decisions.  Second, we 
expand to the scope of existing empirical studies by including regions and crops that have 
historically experienced high loss ratios under the Federal crop insurance program.  Our 
results provide strong evidence that insurance participation encourages producers to 
abandon their crops during the growing season for corn in Central Plains and Southern 
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Over the past three decades, a variety of crop yield and revenue insurance contracts have 
been introduced under the U.S. Federal Crop Insurance Program to assist agricultural 
producers manage their financial risks.  Although crop insurance is designed to protect 
producers from financial risks, many researchers and policy analysts have argued that 
crop insurance may actually induce greater risk by providing producers with incentives to 
alter their production practices in such a way as to increase the likelihood of receiving an 
indemnity.  This economic phenomenon is known as moral hazard. 
  Numerous studies have examined how crop insurance affects producer behavior 
(Chambers 1989; Coble et al. 1997; Chambers and Quiggin 2002).  The majority of 
studies have focused on the effects of crop insurance on specific production practices, 
and have provided contradictory or inconclusive evidence of moral hazard.  For example, 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) assessed the effects of crop insurance on fertilizer 
application and pesticide use among corn producers in the U.S. Midwest, concluding that 
crop insurance participation increased nitrogen application by 19% and pesticide use by 
7%.  In contrast, Smith and Goodwin (1996) concluded that insured Kansas dryland 
wheat producers use less chemical inputs than uninsured producers.  Using a simulation 
model, Babcock and Hennessy (1996) concluded that Iowa corn producers who purchase 
insurance use less nitrogen fertilizer.  Another study by Wu (1999) estimated the 
response of crop mix to insurance participation using survey data from individual corn 
producers in the Central Nebraska Basin and found that insurance participation 
encourages producers to switch to crops with higher expected economic returns, leading 
to increases in chemical use.  More recent work by Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal (2004) 
studied the effects of insurance participation on corn and soybean production in the Corn   3
Belt and wheat and barley production in the Upper Great Plains.  They concluded that 
crop insurance participation leads to relatively modest increases in acreage and has 
ambiguous impacts on input use. 
  The failure of empirical studies to uncover unambiguous and conclusive evidence 
of moral hazard in the U.S. crop insurance program may be attributable to various 
reasons, two of which are especially relevant to the research we undertake here.  First 
virtually all empirical studies to date have searched for evidence of moral hazard by 
examining the effects of crop insurance on planting-time crop allocation and fertilizer 
input decisions.  We contend, however, that the effects of crop insurance on input 
decisions can easily be masked by other factors affecting production decisions, making it 
difficult to detect moral hazard empirically.  For example, decisions regarding chemical 
use may be driven more by weather conditions than by crop insurance participation in 
regions where profound pest infestations are common (Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993). 
  Second, most empirical studies to date have focused on the effects of crop 
insurance on major field crops in the Midwest and Upper Great Plains.  The actuarial 
performance of the U.S. crop insurance program in these regions, however, has 
historically been substantially better than in other regions of the country, suggesting that 
the conditions necessary for significant moral hazard are likely to be stronger elsewhere.  
Figure 1 documents regional variation in Federal crop insurance loss ratios (indemnities 
received divided by premium paid by producers) during 1989-2004
1.  As seen in figure 1, 
the U.S. crop insurance program has operated on a nearly actuarially sound basis in the 
                                                 
1 A crop insurance program is generally regarded as self-sufficient if its loss ratio equal to one (or a little 
less than 1 to account for administrative and other costs).   4
Midwest, California, and parts of Far West, but not in the Northeast, South, and Delta 
States regions. 
  In this study, we seek empirical evidence of moral hazard in the U.S. crop 
insurance program, departing from the established empirical literature in two significant 
respects.  First, we attempt to uncover evidence of moral hazard by examining the effects 
of crop insurance on post-planting decisions that theoretically can be expected to be more 
sensitive to the incidence of crop insurance than input decisions.  In particular, we seek to 
find evidence that crop insurance can significantly increase the likelihood of post-
planting crop abandonment.  Second, we expand the scope of our empirical analysis to 
include regions and crops that have historically experienced high loss ratios under the 
Federal crop insurance program.  In particular, we attempt to uncover evidence of moral 
hazard in the production of corn and upland cotton in the Southeast, Delta States and 
Southern Plains regions of USA. 
  In the next section, we develop a theoretical intra-seasonal dynamic optimization 
model that can explicitly explain a producer’s crop abandonment decisions.  The model 
lacks analytic solution and is solved using numerical techniques (Miranda and Fackler 
2002).  We perform sensitivity analysis with regards to key model parameters and derive 
testable qualitative implications regarding the factors that are most likely to affect 
producer crop abandonment decisions.  These factors include both participation in the 
crop insurance program and unfavorable changes in price and weather conditions during 
the growing season.  In the subsequent section, a Logit model justified by the theoretical 
arguments is developed and estimated using a pooled cross-sectional, time-series of corn 
and upland cotton county-level yields during the years 1989 – 2004.  In the final section,   5
we draw conclusions from our theoretical and empirical analysis and suggest directions 
for future research. 
 
A Theoretical Dynamic Model of Crop Abandonment 
Most existing studies of moral hazard in crop insurance rely on static models that ignore 
that crop abandonment decisions typically take place during the growing season in 
response to changes in harvest-time price and yield expectations (Chambers 1989; 
Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993; Vercammen and van Kooten 1994; Babcock and 
Hennessy 1996; Coble et al. 1997; Chambers and Quiggin 2002). 
  In this section, we construct a theoretical intra-seasonal dynamic optimization 
model that can explicitly explain producer crop abandonment decisions.  The theoretical 
model begins by assuming that a producer’s objective is to maximize expected net profit 
at harvest.  The model allows a producer to re-evaluate price and yield expectations at an 
intermediate point in time between planting and harvest and, based on revised 
expectations, to decide whether to abandon the crop. 
 
Producer’s Decision Problem without Crop Insurance 
Consider a crop producer whose goal is to maximize expected net profit realized at 
harvest time.  The crop year is divided into two periods: period 1, which begins at time 
0 = t  and ends at  1 = t , and period 2, which begins at  1 = t  and ends at  2 = t .  At  0 = t , 
the producer observes current growing and market conditions and undertakes his/her 
planting decision.  At  1 = t , the producer observes current growing and market conditions 
and decides whether to continue cultivation the crop to bring it to harvest, or to abandon   6
his/her crop.  At time  2 = t , the producer harvests his/her crop, provided he/she did not 
abandon it earlier, and sells the total amount produced y, at the prevailing market price p. 
  The price and yield at harvest are stochastic: 
   () 2 1
~ , ~ , η η p p p =  
() 2 1
~ , ~ , ε ε y y y =  
Here,  p  and  y  denote, respectively, the price and yield expected at harvest time 
conditional on information available at planting time  0 = t ;  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε  denote exogenous 
price and yield shocks realized over period 1 and observed by the producer at time  1 = t ; 
and  2
~ η  and  2
~ ε  denote exogenous price and yield shocks realized over period 2 and 
observed by the producer at harvest time  2 = t . 
  In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that it is always profitable for the 
producer to plant at the beginning of the crop year and focus on his/her decision d, 
undertaken at time  1 = t , whether to abandon his/her crop or to bring it to market.  At 
time  0 = t , the producer incurs at a cost  0 1 > c  to plant his/her crop.  At time  1 = t , the 
producer observes the first-period price and yield shocks,  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε , allowing him/her to 
update the probability distribution of the final yield and harvest-time price.  At this 
juncture, the producer decides whether to abandon his/her crop or to continue to cultivate 
it.  If he/she decides to abandon his/her crop,  0 = d , the producer’s terminal yield will be 
zero and his/her terminal profits will be, with certainty 
(1)   1 0 c W −  
where  0 W  is his/her initial wealth.  If he/she decides not to abandon his/her crop,  1 = d , 
the producer’s terminal expected profits will be   7
(2)   () ( ) 2 1 2 1 2 1 0
~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , c c y y p p W − − ⋅ + ε ε η η  
where  2 c  is the cost of further cultivation and harvesting incurred over period 2. 
  The rational producer will elect to abandon his crops at time  1 = t  if the quantity 
in (1) exceeds the expectation of the quantity in (2), conditional on the information 
known at time  1 = t .  The decision to abandon will thus depend primarily on the market 
conditions that exist at the abandonment decision point  1 = t , as revealed in the observed 
values of the first period price and yield shocks  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε .  The set of all possible values 
of  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε  can be partitioned into two subsets, the values that result in an optimal 
decision to abandon  () 0 ~ , ~
1 1 = η ε d  and the values that result in an optimal decision to 
continue cultivation  () 1 ~ , ~
1 1 = η ε d . 
  Given the joint probability distribution f of  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε , the ex-ante probability of 
crop abandonment is given by: 
(3)   Pr(abandonment)   ( ) ( ) 0 ~ , ~ Pr 1 1 = = η ε d  
( )
() 1 1 0 , 1 1
1 1
, η ε η ε
η ε d d f
d ∫∫ = =  
According to this decision model, the likelihood at planting time that a producer will 
subsequently abandon his/her crop depends upon the model parameters: initial wealth 
0 W , the costs of production at periods 1 and 2,  1 c  and  2 c , the yield expected at harvest 
conditional on information available at planting time  y , the price expected at harvest 











2 1, η η σ σ . 
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Producer’s Decision Problem with Crop Insurance 
Consider now a producer who purchases multiple peril crop yield insurance at planting.  
Upon purchasing the insurance, the producer elects a coverage θ  that specifies the 
proportion of his/her program yield 
∗ y  to be insured.  Under the terms of the contract, 
the producer pays a premium π  entitling him/her to receive an indemnity if his/her 
realized yield falls below the insured level.  Most specifically, the indemnity received by 
the producer equals 
   { } y y p −
∗ ∗ θ , 0 max  
where y is the realized yield, 
∗ p  is the price election, which is typically set at or near to 
the harvest-time futures price at planting, and 
∗ y  is the producer’s program yield, which 
is typically set at or near the simple average of the producer’s yields over the preceding 
ten years. 
  The purchase of insurance alters the producer’s abandonment decision problem.  
At time  1 = t , the producer observes the first-period price and yield shocks,  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε , 
and decides whether to abandon his/her crop or to continue to cultivate it, based on 
his/her expectation of not only his/her final yield and market price, but also his/her net 
insurance benefits.  More specifically, if he/she decides to abandon his/her crop,  0 = d , 
the producer’s terminal yield will be zero, implying that he/she will collect the full 
liability under the contract, ( )
∗ ∗ ⋅ y p θ , and his/her terminal profits will be, with certainty 
(4)  
∗ ∗ ⋅ + − − y p c W θ π 1 0  
If he/she decides not to abandon his/her crop,  1 = d , the producer’s terminal expected 
profits will be   9
(5)   () ( ) () { } 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 0
~ , ~ , , 0 max ~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , ε ε θ π ε ε η η y y y p c c y y p p W − + − − − ⋅ +
∗ ∗  
  The rational insured producer will elect to abandon his crops if the quantity (4) 
exceeds the expectation of the quantity in (5), conditional on the information known at 
time  1 = t .  The decision to abandon will thus depend primarily on the market conditions 
that exist at the abandonment decision point  1 = t , as revealed in the observed values of 
the first period price and yield shocks  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε .  As with the uninsured producer, the set 
of all possible values of  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε  can be partitioned into two subsets, the values that 
result in an optimal decision to abandon  ( ) 0 ~ , ~
1 1 = η ε d  and the values that result in an 
optimal decision to continue cultivation  ( ) 1 ~ , ~
1 1 = η ε d . 
  Given the joint probability distribution f of  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε , the ex-ante probability of 
crop abandonment is given by: 
Pr(abandonment)   ( ) ( ) 0 ~ , ~ Pr 1 1 = = η ε d  
( )
() 1 1 0 , 1 1
1 1
, η ε η ε
η ε d d f
d ∫∫ = =  
According to this decision model, the likelihood that an insured producer will abandon 
crop in any given year depends upon the model parameters: initial wealth  0 W , the crop 
insurance premium, π , the coverage level θ , the program price 
∗ p , the historical 
average yield 
∗ y , the costs of production,  1 c  and  2 c , the yield expected at harvest 
conditional on information available at planting time  y , the price expected at harvest 
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Numerical Solution 
Due to the nonlinear nature of the decision problem, it is generally not possible to solve 
the model analytically for a closed-form solution.  Thus, we employed numerical 
methods to compute accurate approximate solutions (Miranda and Fackler 2002).  In 
particular, the nonlinear equations without crop insurance (6) and with crop insurance 
(7): 
(6)   ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 2 1 0 ~ , ~ , 1 0
~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ,
1 1 c c y y p p W E c W y p − − + = − ε ε η η η ε  
(7)  
∗ ∗ ⋅ + − − y p c W θ π 1 0  
( ) ( )











2 1 2 1 2 1 0
~ , ~ , ~ , ~ , , 0 max
~ , ~ , ~ , ~ ,
1 1 ε ε θ π
ε ε η η
η ε y y y p
c c y y p p W
E y p  
were solved using Newton’s method to determine the combinations of  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε  at which 
the producer is indifferent between abandonment and non-abandonment.  This allows us 
to partition the set of all  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε  into two regions, the set of values for which 
abandonment is optimal and the set of values for which it is not. 
  Newton’s method is designed for rootfinding problems of the form  () 0 = x f .  The 
algorithm begins with the analyst supplying a guess  ( ) 0 x  for the root of f.  Given  () k x , the 
subsequent iterate  () 1 + k x  is computed by solving the linear rootfinding problem obtained 
by replacing f with its first order Taylor approximation about  ( ) k x : 
   () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
1 = − ′ + ≈
+ k k k k x x x f x f x f  
This yields the iteration rule 
   ( ) () () ( ) [] () ( )
k k k k x f x f x x
1 1 − + ′ − ←  
Iterates are computed until they converge.   11
  After (6) and (7) were solved numerically for the region of abandonment and non-
abandonment, the probability of crop abandonment in (3) was further computed by 
integrating the joint probability density function of  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε .  The integration was 
performed numerically using Gaussian quadrature.  Gaussian quadrature is a method for 
approximating a definite integral with a weighted sum of function values:   





i i I x f w dx x w x f
1
) (  
where  i w  is the quadrature weights and  i x  is the quadrature nodes.  Specifically, 
Gaussian quadrature nodes and weights are chosen as to satisfy moment-matching 
conditions.  Specifically, given an order of approximation n, Gaussian quadrature rules 
choose n quadrature nodes  i x  and n quadrature weights  i w  such that 







h h x w dx x w x x E
1
~ , for  1 2 , , 1 , 0 − = n h K  
Gaussian quadrature effectively discretizes the continuous variable x ~  by replacing it with 
a discrete random variable that possesses the same moments of order less than 2n.  Given 
the mass points and probabilities of the discrete approximant, the expectation of any 
function of the continuous random variable  x ~ may be approximated using the 
expectation of the function of the discrete approximant, which requires only the 
computation of a weighted sum (Miranda and Fackler 2002). 





i i I x f w dx x w x f x Ef
1
) ( ~  
  In performing our numerical analysis, the routine qnwnorm  from the Matlab 
CompEcon Toolbox (Miranda and Fackler 2002) was used to compute Gaussian nodes 
and weights for the jointly normal random variables  1
~ η  and  2
~ η , using 50 Gaussian nodes   12
for  1
~ η  and 40 nodes for  2
~ η , yielding a grid of 2000 total nodes.  Representing the 
abandonment boundary by writing  1
~ ε  as a function h of  1
~ η , the probability of crop 
abandonment can be approximated by 
(8)   Pr(abandonment)   ( ) ( ) 0 ~ , ~ Pr 1 1 = = η ε d  
( )
() ( ) 1 1 1 0 , 1 1
1 1
η ε η η ε
η ε d d g f
H ∫∫ > =  
( )
( ) () 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
η η ε η ε
η ε
d g d f ∫∫
∞
∞ −∞ − ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ =  
() () ( ) 1 1 1 η η η d g h F ∫
∞
∞ − =  
where f is the probability density function of  1 ε  conditional on  1 η , F is the cumulative 
distribution of  1 ε  conditional on  1 η , and g is the marginal probability density function of 
1 η . 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Our base-case simulation assumes the parameter values shown in table 1.  By definition, 
the contract yield is the selected yield coverage level multiplied by the program yield 
specified by Risk Management Agency (RMA) and, likewise, the contract price is the 
selected price coverage level multiplied by the program price specified by the RMA.  
Here, the program price and program yield, without loss of generality, are normalized to 
one and the yield coverage level and price coverage level are 85% and 100%, 
respectively.  In addition, the variances of price and yield are normalized to imply a 20% 
annual volatility, which is reasonable for U.S. field crops.   13
  By solving Equation (6) and (7) numerically, we get the set of  1
~ η  and  1
~ ε  that 
define the boundary along which the producer is indifferent between abandoning the crop 
and bringing it to harvest, for both insured and uninsured producers (see figure 2).  In 
figure 2, we see that the region of non-abandonment for the insured producers is smaller 
than the regions of non-abandonment for uninsured.  In other words, insured producers 
are more likely to abandon their crop than uninsured producers.  Insured producers thus 
require either a higher expected price or a higher expected yield, or both, at period 1 than 
the uninsured producers in order to bring the crop to harvest. 
  We call the region between the decision boundaries of the insured and the 
uninsured producers the moral hazard region.  In this region, the uninsured producer will 
bring the crop to harvest, but the insured producer will not.  Another important feature 
found in figure 2 is the crop abandonment decision boundary appears to be roughly a 
curve of constant expected revenue.  This is to be expected, since the producer, in making 
an abandonment decision, should be indifferent at any price-yield combinations that 
produce that same expected revenue.  As seen in figure 2, the probability of abandoning 
the crop decreases (increases), as the high (low) levels of yield and price at period 1 are 
observed at the same time. 
  Once the regions of abandonment and non-abandonment have been determined, 
the ex-ante probability of abandonment with and without crop insurance can be computed 
numerically.  The difference between these two probabilities 
(9)   ( ) ( ) ( ) noninsured abandon insured abandon t abandonmen Pr Pr Pr − = ∆  
is taken as measure of the degree of moral hazard induced by crop insurance.   14
  Sensitivity analyses were performed to explore the relationships between this 
operational measure of moral hazard and key model parameters.  We began by examining 
how the variances of the price and yield affect the magnitude of the change in the 
probability of crop abandonment due to the purchase of crop insurance.  Figure 3 plots 
the probability of crop abandonment versus price variance at period 1 for both insured 
and uninsured producers.  Unlike insured producers, producers without crop insurance 
are unresponsive to small price variances at period 1, though as the variance increases, 
the probabilities of crop abandonment for both the insured and the uninsured producers 
increase (see figure 3(a)).  In addition, the growth rates of the probability of crop 
abandonment between the insured and the uninsured are not identical.  Figure 3(b) shows 
that changes in the probability of crop abandonment exhibits concavity, which suggests 
that moral hazard becomes more pronounced the higher the price variance at period 1, but 
eventually turns downward.  Accordingly, up to a certain price variance at period 1, the 
producers will have no incentives to bring the crop to harvest. 
  In contrast, the probability of crop abandonment is relatively insensitive to the 
price variance at period 2; this is shown in figure 4.  The uninsured producer will not 
abandon the crop and the insured producer has a fixed probability of crop abandonment 
regardless of the values of price variance at period 2. 
  The probabilities of crop abandonment versus yield variance at periods 1 and 2 
are shown in figures 5 and 6.  As seen in these figures, the yield variances at periods 1 
and 2 have the same impacts on the producer’s crop abandonment decision.  The 
producer who purchases crop insurance still has a greater incentive to abandon his/her 
crop than the producer who does not purchase crop insurance, even in the extreme case in   15
which the variances of yield are zero.  From figure 5(a), the insured producers are 
sensitive to the yield variance at period 1 as well as to the price variance at period 1.  The 
probability of crop abandonment for the insured producer reaches one, while the 
uninsured producer still not abandon the crop and, after the yield variance exceeds 3.5, 
the probability of crop abandonment for the uninsured producer increases dramatically.  
That is, when growing conditions are not favorable, the insured producers have higher 
incentives to abandon their crop, which is consistent with the conclusion of Coble et al. 
(1997).  When extremely unfavorable weather occurs, both insured and uninsured 
producers will abandon their crops.  Therefore, the moral hazard associated with 
purchasing crop insurance diminishes starting at the yield variance of 3.5 (see figure 5(b) 
and figure 6).  In figure 7, we plot the changes in the probability of crop abandonment 
with respect to the joint distribution of price and yield variances at period 1.  Not 
surprisingly, the figure provides a similar story as in the previous paragraphs. 
  Similarly, changes in the probability of crop abandonment were assessed with 
respect to all other model parameters, including net harvest cost, which is paid by the 
producer only if the crop is not abandoned at period 1, and the price-yield correlation.  
Note that the cost over period 1 is a sunk cost and thus is not relevant to the abandonment 
decision at time 1.  Intuitively, the producer’s marginal payoff reduces as the net harvest 
cost borne over period 2 increases.  As the net harvest cost increases, the probabilities of 
not bringing the crop to harvest for the insured and the uninsured both rise.  Ultimately, 
changes in the probability of crop abandonment converge to zero (see figure 8).  Figure 9 
illustrates how the changes in the probability of crop abandonment are associated with 
the correlation between the log yield and log price.  In the extreme case in which log   16
yield and log price are perfectly negatively correlated, the gross revenue remains constant 
regardless of the changes in yield and price.  The probability of crop abandonment for the 
insured and the uninsured producers are close to zero.  Due to the purchase of crop 
insurance, the probability of crop abandonment increases as the price-yield correlation 
increases. 
  The last two sensitivity analyses examine how the probability of crop 
abandonment changes in response to contract yield and contract price.  Zero contract 
yields and prices correspond to the polar case in which no crop insurance is purchased.  
From figure 10 and figure 11, increases in contract yield and contract price raise the 
probability of crop abandonment among insured producers.  In other words, the insured 
producers are more likely to abandon the crop if higher coverage levels are selected. 
 
Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we discuss empirical analysis of the effects of insurance on crop 
abandonment for corn in North Central and Central Plains regions and for corn and 
upland cotton in Southeast, Delta States and Southern Plains regions. 
 
Data and Econometric Model 
We measured crop abandonment as the ratio of total planted acres less harvested acres 
divided by total planted acres.  Given that the dependent variable is a proportion, a simple 
Logit model with proportional data is estimated using weighted least-squares method also 
known as the minimum logit chi-square method (Maddala 1983, p.30).  Specifically, I 
posit that   17










log ,  T t n i , , 1 , , , 1 K K = =  
where  it p ˆ  is the proportion of planted acres abandoned in county i in year t,  it x  denotes a 
vector of independent explanatory variables observed for county i in year t and  it u  is 
normally distributed with  ()0 = it u E  and  ( )
2 σ = it u Var .  Note that  () it it p p ˆ 1 ˆ − , the 
probability of abandonment divided by the probability of non-abandonment, gives the 
odds of abandonment.  The parameter i β  therefore represents the percentage change in 
the odds of abandonment resulting from a unit increase in the value of i
th predictor. 
  One major challenge in this empirical study is that individual farm level data are 
not generally available.  Thus, I used pooled cross-sectional, time series of county-level 
yields and crop insurance participation during 1989-2004 published in the Ag Statistic 
Data Base of National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) and Summary of Business 
Statistics of Risk Management Agency (RMA).  
  One possible measure of crop insurance participation is the ratio of insured 
planted acres to total planted acres (Goodwin 1993).  It is important to recognize, 
however, that insured and total planted acres data are collected by different U.S. 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) agencies using different methods and are often 
inconsistent.  Specifically, county-level planted acres data are compiled by the National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) using sample surveys of farm operators, while 
insured planted acres data are compiled by the Risk Management Agency (RMA) from 
individual crop insurance policy data.  The magnitudes of sampling and nonsampling 
errors
2 in both series are unknown.  If most farm enterprises are generally small in a 
                                                 
2 See Lohr for more detailed discussion.   18
given county, the magnitudes of sampling and nonsampling errors are likely to be severe.  
In fact, in some counties, the insured planted acres reported by RMA exceed the total 
planted acres reported by NASS. 
  Another drawback of using the ratio of insured planted acres to total plated acres 
as a measure of insurance participation was pointed out by Goodwin, Vandeveer and 
Deal (2004).   It is often likely that the producers change their level of participation by 
choosing different price elections or yield coverage levels rather than by changing the 
number of acres insured.  As an alternative, Goodwin, Vandeveer and Deal proposed 
measuring program participation as the ratio of total liability divided by total possible 
liability; total possible liability is the product of the futures market price, planted acres 
and 75% of the county average yield for the preceding 10 years.  However, maximum 
yield coverage levels have been extended to 85% or 90% across crops and insurance 
contracts over the past decade.  As a result, computing total possible liability assuming 
75% coverage will often produce a program participation ratio greater than one for recent 
years.  In this study, we therefore measure insurance participation as the ratio of liability 
to expected value of production; with the latter set equal to product of total planted acres, 
the expected market price and the expected harvest yield. 
  It is important that the independent variables used in my empirical analysis 
effectively capture crop abandonment effects.  Changes in the crop price is an important 
factor that explains crop abandonment decisions.  Crop producers are more likely to 
abandon their crop, with or without insurance, if prices drop during the growing season.  
Using corn futures price data from Chicago Board of Trade and upland cotton futures 
price data from New York Board of Trade, changes in harvest price expectations during   19
the growing season are calculated by taking the difference between the harvest-time 
futures price observed in mid-season and the harvest-time futures price observed at 
planting time.  The assumed planting time, seasonal mid-point, and harvest time varied 
across crops and regions, as documented in table 2. 
  Similarly, crop producers are more likely to abandon their crop, with or without 
insurance, if weather worsens during the growing season.  Here, we used the monthly 
Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) to measure changes in growing conditions during 
the growing season.  The PDSI is published by National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) of 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  The PDSI is calculated 
from precipitation, temperature and soil moisture measures for each Climate Division in 
the U.S.  Its values generally range between -6.0 and 6.0, which classifies moisture 
condition from dry to wet.  As a result, a categorical variable, unfavorable weather, is 
created to represent the weather factor in the model (see table 3).  If the averaged 
monthly PDSI between the assumed planting time and seasonal mid-point is within the 
normal range, from -0.49 to 0.49, unfavorable weather is equal to one.  If the averaged 
monthly PDSI between the assumed planting time and seasonal mid-point falls into the 
category of developing wet spell or drought, ( ] 99 . 0 , 49 . 0  or [ ) 49 . 0 , 99 . 0 − − , unfavorable 
weather is equal to two.  Any averaged monthly PDSI values above +3.99 or below -3.99 
is considered as extreme category of wet spell or drought and unfavorable weather is 
scaled up to six.  A positive relationship between unfavorable weather and crop 
abandonment is expected. 
  Though our theoretical model predicts that many factors affect producers’ crop 
abandonment decisions, the effects of some, such as price-yield correlation, net harvest   20
cost, contract yield, and contract price, will be difficult to detect empirically.  For 
example, NASS provides estimates of harvest costs.  The census, however, is collected 
every five years, making it infeasible to use the variable to measure inter-year variations.  
These costs, moreover, vary very little over time.  Similarly, the contract yield and 
contract price are defined as selected coverage level of predetermined yield and 
predetermined price.  In reality, most producers in a given county tend to select the same 
coverage level for price or yield.  Given that county-level data are used in the study, the 
impacts of contract yield and contract price on producers’ crop abandonment decisions 




Our theoretical dynamic economic decision model assumes that crop producers make 
decisions on whether to abandon the crop at an intermediate point in time between 
planting and harvest.  Given that producers can curtail crop production in any month 
during the growing season, we have explored different choices for the intermediate 
abandonment decision point.  The specification that provides results that are the most 
consistent with the life cycle of crop development and satisfying the hypothesis were 
selected (USDA 1997).  Table 4 provides descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
empirical study.  The mean crop abandonment ratios are relatively high in the Southeast 
and Plains regions for corn and in Southern Plain for upland cotton.  In addition, 
unfavorable weather, as indicated by the Palmer drought index, is more likely to be 
observed in the Plains regions.  Based on our theoretical dynamic model, we anticipate   21
finding significant positive effects of unfavorable weather on crop abandonment in 
Central Plains and Southern Plains regions. 
  The estimates presented in table 5 are mostly consistent with our expectations.  
Unfavorable weather significantly increases crop abandonment among corn and cotton 
producers in major production regions.  Intuitively, adverse weather reduces yield and 
thus revenue expectations, providing incentives for producers to abandon their crops.  
This is also consistent with the results of Coble et al. (1997).  As table 5 shows, the 
estimates of unfavorable weather are statistically significant and positive for corn and 
upland cotton in most regions at 5% significant level, which implies that unfavorable 
weather increases the rate of crop abandonment among corn producers in North Central, 
Central Plains and Southeast regions and among upland cotton producers in all Southern 
regions.  
  Our results also indicate that crop insurance participation promotes abandonment 
of corn in the Central Plains and Southern Plains regions and abandonment of upland 
cotton in the Southeast, Delta States and Southern Plains regions.  The odds of 
abandonment of corn in the Central Plains and Southern Plain regions, respectively, are 
estimated to rise by 0.3% and 1.14% per percent increase in insurance participation.  
Also, the odds of abandonment of upland cotton in Southeast, Delta States and Southern 
Plains regions, respectively, are estimated to rise by 3.4%, 0.58% and 0.77% per percent 
increase in insurance participation. 
  In contrast, insurance participation significantly reduces crop abandonment for 
corn in North Central, Southeast and Delta States regions.  It is not clear why insurance 
participation decreases crop abandonment in these regions.  However, the Federal Crop   22
Insurance Program in the North Central region is, for the most part, actuarially sound (see 
figure 1), suggesting that the conditions necessary for moral hazard would be difficult to 
detect here.  In addition, corn is rarely produced in the Southeast and Delta States 
regions.  It is often planted as an alternative to cotton. 
  As expected, the rate of crop abandonment increases if the futures price declines 
during the growing season.  Price declines have a positive effect on crop abandonment 
for both upland cotton and corn in most regions, except for corn in Southern Plains and 
upland cotton in Southeast.  The odds of abandoning corn in the North Central, Central 
Plains, Southeast and Delta States regions, respectively, are estimated to increase by 
0.16%, 0.7%, and 2.07% per one cent decrease in the futures price of corn.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we have constructed a theoretical intra-seasonal dynamical optimization 
model that can explicitly explain producers’ crop abandonment decisions.  Assuming that 
each producer’s objective is to maximize expected wealth at harvest, the model allows 
each producer to re-evaluate price and yield expectations in mid-season and to abandon 
his/her crop if the expected future rewards from continuing to cultivate do not exceed the 
expected future rewards of abandoning.  The model was solved numerically and 
sensitivity analyses were performed to explore the relationship between crop 
abandonment, with and without crop insurance, and key model parameters.   
  Our empirical analysis of the effect of crop insurance participation on crop 
abandonment decisions using a Logit model provides strong evidence that participation   23
encourages abandonment for corn in Central Plains and Southern Plains regions and for 
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Variable  Parameter  Values in the Dynamic Model 
contract price 
∗ p   1.00 
contract yield 
∗ y   0.85 
net harvest cost  2 c   0.10 
price variance at period 1  1 vp   0.02 
price variance at period 2  2 vp   0.02 
yield variance at period 1  1 vy   0.02 
yield variance at period 2  2 vy   0.02 
log price-yield correlation  ρ   0.00 
initial futures log price  p   ( ) 2 2 1 vp vp + −  
initial futures log yield  y   ( ) 2 2 1 vy vy + −  
 
Note: i) Contract price and contract yield are normalized to one, and 100% price protection level and 85% 
yield coverage level are selected, respectively.  ii) Variances of price and yield at periods 1 and 2 are 
normalized to imply a 20% annual volatility, which is reasonable for U.S. field crops.   
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Crop / Region  Description 
CORN  
North Central  averaged monthly PDSI between April - June 
  changes in December futures price observed in April and in 
June 
Central Plains  averaged monthly PDSI between March - April 
  changes in December futures price observed in March and 
in May 
Southeast  averaged monthly PDSI between March - June 
  changes in December futures price observed in March and 
in July 
Delta States  averaged monthly PDSI between March - June 
  changes in December futures price observed in March and 
in July 
Southern Plains  averaged monthly PDSI between March - April 




Southeast  averaged monthly PDSI between March - May 
  changes in December futures price observed in March and 
in May 
Delta States  averaged monthly PDSI between July - August 
  changes in December futures price observed in July and in 
August 
Southern Plains   
North  averaged monthly PDSI between April - June 
  changes in December futures price observed in April and in 
July 
Central  averaged monthly PDSI between April - May 
  changes in December futures price observed in April and in 
June 
South  averaged monthly PDSI between March - April 









   28
Variable Description 
  
Crop Abandonment Ratio  = (planted acres – harvested acres) / planted acres  
  
Unfavorable  Weather  = 1, if averaged monthly PDSI between the assumed 
planting time and seasonal mid-point falls into the category 
of normal range, from -0.49 to 0.49. 
  = 2, if averaged monthly PDSI between the assumed 
planting time and seasonal mid-point falls into the 
“developing” category of wet spell, from 0.49 to 0.99, or 
drought, from -0.99 to -0.49. 
  = 3, if averaged monthly PDSI between the assumed 
planting time and seasonal mid-point falls into the “mild” 
category of wet spell, from 0.99 to 1.99, or drought, from -
1.99 to -0.99. 
  = 4, if averaged monthly PDSI between the assumed 
planting time and seasonal mid-point falls into the 
“moderate” category of wet spell, from 1.99 to 2.99, or 
drought, from -2.99 to -1.99. 
  = 5, if averaged monthly PDSI between the assumed 
planting time and seasonal mid-point falls into the “severe” 
category of wet spell, from 2.99 to 3.99, or drought, from -
3.99 to -2.99. 
  = 6, if averaged monthly PDSI between the assumed 
planting time and seasonal mid-point falls into the 
“extreme” category of wet spell, above 3.99, or drought, 
below -3.99. 
  
Insurance Participation  = (planted acres insured*coverage level) / planted acres 
  
Price  Change  = December futures price observed in mid-season – 
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  CORN  COTTON 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev    Mean  Std. Dev 
          
NORTH CENTRAL           
Crop Abandonment Ratio  0.08  0.11        
Unfavorable Weather  3.01 1.36        
Insurance Participation  0.34 0.18        
Price Change  -0.07 0.17        
          
CENTRAL PLAINS           
Crop Abandonment Ratio  0.15 0.18        
Unfavorable Weather  3.71 1.54        
Insurance Participation  0.43 0.19        
Price Change  -0.01  0.09        
          
SOUTHEAST          
Crop Abandonment Ratio  0.19 0.21     0.03  0.07  
Unfavorable Weather  2.80 1.37     2.97  1.26  
Insurance Participation  0.26 0.17     0.40  0.22  
Price Change  -0.08 0.21     -0.00  0.03  
          
DELTA STATES           
Crop Abandonment Ratio  0.08  0.09     0.02  0.02  
Unfavorable Weather  2.53 1.17     3.01  1.33  
Insurance Participation  0.35 0.18     0.35  0.23  
Price Change  -0.08 0.21     -0.01  0.02  
          
SOUTHERN PLAINS           
Crop Abandonment Ratio  0.12  0.13     0.16  0.20  
Unfavorable Weather  3.25 1.39     3.20  1.40  
Insurance Participation  0.38 0.21     0.48  0.19  
Price Change  -0.01  0.09     -0.00  0.02  
 
Note: price units for corn and upland cotton are cents per bushel and cents per pound. 
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
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  CORN COTTON 
Variable  Estimate Std. Error Estimate  Std. Error
NORTH CENTRAL   
Intercept -1.65*  0.04  
Unfavorable Weather  0.05*  0.01  
Insurance Participation  -2.23*  0.07  
Price Change  -0.16*  0.07  
Number of Observation  9957  
CENTRAL PLAINS   
Intercept -2.25*  0.07  
Unfavorable Weather  0.02*  0.01  
Insurance Participation  0.30*  0.10  
Price Change  -0.70*  0.21  
Number of Observation  4233  
SOUTHEAST   
Intercept -1.33*  0.05 -5.53*  0.15
Unfavorable Weather  0.09*  0.01 0.39*  0.03
Insurance Participation  -1.38*  0.12 3.40*  0.24
Price Change  -0.26*  0.09            2.58    1.65
Number of Observation  5000 1391 
DELTA STATES   
Intercept -1.91*  0.19 -4.09*  0.12
Unfavorable Weather       -0.02  0.05 0.10*  0.03
Insurance Participation  -1.20*  0.33 0.58*  0.16
Price Change  -2.07*  0.29 -5.78*  1.64
Number of Observation  397 792 
SOUTHERN PLAINS   
Intercept -2.20*  0.10 -1.91*  0.18
Unfavorable Weather        -0.03  0.02 0.12*  0.03
Insurance Participation  1.14*  0.14 0.77*  0.28
Price Change        -0.31  0.27 -9.24* 1.53
Number of Observation  1270 1576 
 
Note: Asterisk (*) denotes variables significant at 5% or smaller level. 
 
 





Figure 1: Loss ratio (indemnities / producer-paid premiums) of U.S. Federal Crop 
Insurance Program, 1989-2004 





Figure 2: Crop abandonment decision boundary 





Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis of crop abandonment vs. price variance at period 1: (a) 
insured vs. uninsured; (b) changes in the probability of crop abandonment 




Figure 4: Changes in the probability of crop abandonment vs. price variance at 
period 2 
 





Figure 5: Sensitivity analysis of crop abandonment vs. yield variance at period 1: (a) 
insured vs. uninsured; (b) changes in the probability of crop abandonment 










Figure 7: Changes in the probability of crop abandonment vs. joint distribution of 
yield and price variances at period 1 





Figure 8: Sensitivity analysis of crop abandonment vs. net harvest cost: (a) insured 
vs. uninsured; (b) changes in the probability of crop abandonment   










Figure 10: Probability of crop abandonment vs. contract yield 
 




Figure 11: Probability of crop abandonment vs. contract price 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 